that ought to be classified, but those ought to be minimal. Otherwise you start generating suspicions and, frankly, generating excuses for other countries. "
The department says that classification is necessary to prevent other nations from obtaining information about US weak points. "Providing a secure environment for the handling of sensitive information in this way makes sense, and will not allow our enemies to gain the advantage should vulnerabilities be revealed, " says Christopher Kelly, a spokesman for the department.
Critics are also worried that the Department of Homeland Security could attempt to classify another project it has in the works: a $450-million complex of highbiosecurity labs and testing grounds called the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility. The department is holding a nationwide competition to determine where the lab will be located; 12 sites remain in the running. Kelly says the department has no plans to classify the complex in question. But one site that has made the shortlist is the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California -which is already a classified facility.
"How will the United States assure the rest of the world that the research is completely defensive if it's being conducted at a classified nuclear-weapons laboratory?" asks Marylia Kelley, executive director of TriValley CAREs, a Livermore-based group that monitors the national laboratory.
NBACC and the bio-agro facility are just part of a recent boom in biodefence spending in the United States. The federal government has spent $36 billion to combat bioterrorism since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, according to an analysis by the Center for Arms Control and Non-proliferation. Three additional biosafety level 4 labs are in the works, including one at Boston University in Massachusetts that has been heavily protested. Fourteen new biosecurity level 2 and 3 labs are also planned.
Pearson argues that the country should spend more on working to prevent bioterrorism in the first place, by strengthening the United Nations' biological and chemical weapons conventions, and improving supervision of its own research. "It wouldn't take much money to strengthen prevention, " he says, "and it would do a lot more to keep us safe. " The move aims to resolve issues that have seen some countries and organizations come under fire for hoarding genetic information about avian flu strains. The reasons for their reluctance to share are varied: some, for example, fear that others might use the data without properly crediting the researchers involved. And there were concerns over whether countries worst hit by bird flu would benefit from the drugs and vaccines developed from the sequences they provide.
Precise details of the GISAID agreement are still being thrashed out. But the idea is that participants will place genetic data into secure sections of existing online databases as soon as possible after producing and analysing them.
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